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CONTRACT LAW IN THE AGRI-FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 
Bianca Gardella Tedeschi* 
 
ABSTRACT 
In Italy, contract law in the agri-food chain is regulated by law 27/2012 
art. 62. The law polices Business-to-Business (“B2B”) contracts with the 
specific purpose of protecting producers. The 2012 law was enacted after an 
intense debate within the European Union (EU), following the 2008 crisis 
that saw a rise in agri-food prices. The law introduces a form of “commercial 
ethics” into the agri-food chain, as it defines and prohibits unfair business 
practices in this field. In 2019, the EU approved Directive EU 2019/633 that 
prohibits in every Member State unfair business practices that are harmful to 
producers. The paper will trace the interplay between national and European 
legislation on unfair trade practices in the agri-food supply chain in order to 
ascertain if they are adequate.  
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I.  FOOD SAFETY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE AGRI-FOOD 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
Italy is worldwide known for its high-quality agricultural products. 
Cheeses, wines, vegetables, pasta, and other delicacies are now readily 
available, both in Italy and abroad, in large-scale distribution and vicinity 
stores, as well as in e-shops. Consumers definitely enjoy the variety of 
specialties that are brought every day on their tables directly from the place 
of origin. Italian products are brought to us because, and thanks to, the food 
supply chain. The agri-food chain is by far the most important system able to 
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bring, from “farm to fork,”1 agricultural and food products. The importance 
of regulations and policing the food supply chain is, therefore, very important 
for the different degrees by which food production and distribution affects 
everybody’s daily life. As we all buy food and beverages, we can potentially 
perceive flaws in the chain, both for fair prices and food safety.  
A major pillar in the food supply chain is agriculture itself as it is 
characterized by a double concern. On the one hand, it is important to take 
care of the consumer’s interests and expectations in order to assure food 
safety and fair prices. On the other hand, it is imperative to protect food 
producers: these important players in the agri-food industries can be 
exploited, as we will see in due course, by retailers and distributors. They 
often become the weak party in the contractual relations that run along the 
agri-food supply chain, where competition among different producers is high 
and their market power low. Agriculture producers are weak in their relations 
with food processors and even weaker with the distribution, especially with 
large-scale retailers. To this, we can add that very often national producers 
may have to contrast competition coming from extra EU states, where costs, 
especially labor costs, are considerably lower and therefore the final product  
is considerably cheaper. An effective agri-food supply chain policing 
requires, then, that the added value in the chain rests with the producers and 
that contractual relations keep a good balance of power all along the chain 
links.  
This paper will describe the main traits of the supply chain as 
highlighted in the EU surveys and the responses presented both at Italian and 
European levels to reach a fairer food supply chain. The last part of the paper 
will reflect on the adequacy of these legislative measures. 
II.  THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE FOOD CHAIN AT THE EUROPEAN 
LEVEL 
The 2008 crisis was accompanied by a steep upsurge in food products’ 
prices. The occurrence stimulated the EU to look into the main features of 
the agri-food supply chain in order to understand why food products have 
 
 * Università del Piemonte Orientale, bianca.gardella@uniupo.it. The author would like to extend 
her thanks to Prof. Jorge Esquirol for putting together the Made in Italy Symposium, to the members of 
the FIU Law Review for their helpful edits and comments, and to her colleague, Vito Rubino, for insightful 
discussions of some issues mentioned in this article.  
 1 Directive 2019/633, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Unfair 
Trading Practices in Business-to-Business Relationships in the Agricultural and Food Supply Chain, 2019 
O.J. (L 111) 59, 60. 
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been so deeply affected by the crisis. The results of several surveys depict a 
lively and, often times unfair, world.  
The first paper issued by the Commission dates back to 2009 and 
consists of a Communication from the Commission to the Parliament. 
According to the Communication, the food chain is characterized by the high 
number of operators, active in the different stages of production, processing, 
marketing, distribution, and retail of agricultural and food products. The 
supply chain connects three important sectors of European economy, i.e., 
agriculture, food processing industry, and distribution.2 According to this EU 
official document, the food supply chain in Europe accomplishes very well 
its task: “it delivers high-quality food products at affordable prices to 
European consumers, it ensures the safety and traceability of food products 
and it can pride itself on the ample supply of highly competitive innovative 
and traditional products.”3 As one important trait in the agri-food supply 
chain is the high number of participants before each product reaches the 
consumer, a number of market participants (producers, processors, retailers, 
etc.) add to its value and have an impact on the final price paid by the 
consumer. From the legal point of view, contract law is the major staple in 
the legal architecture of this important economic organization, as each link is 
formed by a discrete contract, all the way down from producer to consumer. 
As contract law is the tool that connects every single link of the chain, it is 
important to understand if it is used fairly by each participant and not 
modeled unfairly by the few that want to reap for themselves what has been 
sowed by others.  
Issues related to equal bargaining power within the supply chain 
between agriculture producers and food operators have been tackled at UE 
and national levels. The importance of the agri-food supply chain for 
consumers and producers has moved European authorities to highlight its 
main characteristics in order to detect flaws or irregularities that need to be 
fixed through legislative or administrative measures. According to European 
Commission studies, the food supply chain is marked by several structural 
weaknesses that may affect every link of the chain, especially the first and 
the last link, the producers and the consumers. But not only them. Large scale 
retailers gained importance in the distribution system and wield considerable 
power along the chain. Moreover, the food supply chain is characterized by 
a multiplicity of actors: farmers, food processors, traders, wholesalers, 
 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Better Functioning Food Supply 
Chain in Europe, at 2, COM (2009) 591 final (Oct. 28, 2009) [hereinafter A Better Functioning Food 
Supply Chain in Europe].   
3 Id. at 4. 
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retailers, and finally consumers. These actors can be either large companies, 
or medium-size or small enterprises, or cooperatives, and can be 
simultaneously competitors, suppliers, or customers.4  
[S]ignificant imbalances in bargaining power between 
contracting parties are a common occurrence. . . . [t]his 
asymmetry in bargaining power may lead to unfair trading 
practices, as larger and more powerful actors seek to impose 
contractual arrangements to their advantage. . . . Such 
practices may occur at every link of the chain and include, 
for example, late payments, unilateral changes in contracts, 
ad-hoc changes to contractual terms, upfront payments as 
entry fees to negotiations.5  
Within the food chain, where the parties, whether buyers or suppliers, 
may exercise their market power, we can detect anti-competitive practices, 
such as cartels and resale price maintenance, to the detriment of the 
consumer.6 Furthermore, the food supply organization “suffers from a lack 
of price transparency and predictability,”7 and there are cases of excessive 
speculation on the commodity market. A characteristic of the food chain in 
Europe is that the chain is highly fragmented between Member States 
because of several economic and cultural differences among European 
citizens. “[H]ousehold incomes, preferences in taste, differences in the level 
of value-added tax or the share of local production”8 are important factors of 
heterogeneity and fragmentation in the chain.  
Despite the fact that every link is a distinct contractual relation, the 
European Commission took a great step forward in 2002 when it decided that  
the food supply chain had to be considered a continuum and not only as 
formed by separate links. The relevant Act was EU Regulation 178/02, 
“laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety.”9 According to Whereas 12 of EU 
178/02:   
[i]n order to ensure the safety of food, it is necessary to 
consider all aspects of the food production chain as a 
continuum from and including primary production and the 
 
4 Id. at 5. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 6.   
7 Id. at 8.  
8 Id. at 10. 
9 Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002.  
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production of animal feed up to and including sale or supply 
of food to the consumer because each element may have a 
potential impact on food safety.10 
This piece of legislation understands the supply chain in the production, 
transformation, and distribution of food as a continuum, and not just phases 
and relative contracts disconnected the one from the other. While the 
Directive addresses issues and concerns related to food safety, it imposes 
duties on all the links in the chain, no matter how their contractual and 
economic power is within the chain. The succeeding interventions of the 
European Commission and European Parliament tackling imbalance of 
bargaining power in the agri-food supply chain are based on the same 
principle, that all the actors in the agri-food supply chain are on the same 
level.  
III.  THE AGRI-FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN AT EUROPEAN LEVEL  
The 2008 crisis brought a visible rise in food products that alerted the 
European Commission. “From mid-2007 to mid-2008, agricultural 
commodity prices rose sharply, which resulted in increased consumer food 
prices and higher inflation levels overall.”11 When prices of any commodities 
came down to a level comparable to those reached before the price surge, 
consumer food prices were still increasing, and it was only in May 2009 that 
they started declining. The European Commission began to monitor the 
supply food chain, worried that “[those] changes have caused considerable 
hardship for agricultural producers and imply that [the] consumers are not 
getting a fair deal.”12 
The European Commission made the first move in order to improve the 
bargaining power within the agri-food and make it fairer towards every weak 
party in 2009 with the Communication COM (2009) 59113 on “A better 
functioning food supply chain in Europe.” The main concern of the European 
Commission was the fluctuation of prices in the food industry, starting from 
the end of 2007 with a substantial increase in prices of food for consumers in 
 
10 Id. at 12. 
11  A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain in Europe, supra note 2, at 2. 
12 Id. In December 2008, the Commission published a report on food prices in Europe that 
monitored the food price increases. See Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committ ee of the 
Regions, Food Prices in Europe, COM (2008) 821 final (Dec. 9, 2008); Lina Bukeviciute, Adriaan Dierx, 
& Fabienne Ilzkovitz, The Functioning of the Food Supply Chain and Its Effect on Food Prices in the 
European Union, 47 EUR. ECON. OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1 (2009).  
13 See A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain in Europe , supra note 2.  
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2008. The research conducted by the Commission highlighted that the 
highest increase of prices was determined by the rise in the prices of food 
processors and distribution distributors, and not in the selling price of farmers 
and food producers. In the words of the Commission: 
[t]he discrepancies observed between commodity and 
consumer food price developments, together with the 
asymmetric response of food prices to commodity price 
fluctuations, relate in part to structural weaknesses in the 
system, such as the number of intermediaries operating 
along the chain and the competitive structure at certain steps 
of the chain.14 
According to the European Commission, the price increase in the food 
chain is, therefore, not due to the rise in production costs but is related to 
imbalance of bargaining power and deceptive practices along different links 
of the chain. “Within the food supply chain, significant imbalances in 
bargaining power between contracting parties are a common occurrence and 
this issue was flagged as a serious concern by stakeholders.”15 The picture of 
the whys and hows of the imbalance is accurately described by the 
Commission:  
This asymmetry in bargaining power may lead to unfair 
trading practices, as larger and more powerful actors seek to 
impose contractual arrangements to their advantage, either 
through better prices or through improved terms and 
conditions. Such practices may occur at every link of the 
chain and include, for example, late payments, unilateral 
changes in contracts, ad-hoc changes to contractual terms, 
upfront payments as entry fees to negotiations . . . . Within 
non-processed food supply chains, small farms and 
cooperatives often deal with larger buyers, be they 
producers, wholesalers or retailers. Within processed food 
supply chains, on the one hand small food processors are 
contracting with usually large retailers that are often their 
only channel for accessing the market. On the other hand, 
large multinational food producers may also have important 
bargaining power as they offer branded products that 
retailers cannot do without.16  
 
14 Id. at 4.  
15 Id. at 5.  
16 Id. at 5. These traits within the food supply chain have been detected as well by Joonkoo Lee, 
Gary Gereffi & Janet Beauvais, Global Value Chains and Agrifood Standards: Challenges and 
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The imbalance of power between contracting parties distorts 
competition and allows the EU to intervene for a redress of this distortion.  
Contractual imbalances associated with unequal bargaining 
power have a negative impact on the competitiveness of the 
food supply chain as smaller but efficient actors may be 
obliged to operate under reduced profitability, limiting their 
ability and incentives to invest in improved product quality 
and innovation of production processes. A better awareness 
of contractual rights and stronger action against unfair 
contractual practices could contribute to preventing these 
drawbacks since actors with limited bargaining power suffer 
from a lack of information on their rights. Moreover, they 
may hesitate to contest contract clauses for fear of losing the 
contract altogether. There is thus a need to better understand, 
and examine in depth, contractual practices and their link to 
asymmetries in bargaining power within the food supply 
chain since, depending on each individual situation, they 
might lead to unfair and inefficient outcomes.17 
A second issue detected by the Commission is the lack of transparency 
along the supply chain. This is due, according to the Communication, to the 
excessive speculation on commodity markets. According to other observers, 
the lack of transparency is connected in contracts between producers and 
food processors or distributors that are made according to old traditions, often 
oral, with a long-term trust relationship.18 
The European Commission, therefore, in 2009 acknowledged the 
distortion of competition in the agri-food industry correlated to imbalance of 
bargaining power along the supply chain and the lack of transparency. This 
state of affairs asks for a study of contractual practices and possible predatory 
attitudes in some links of the chain. The Commission considers, therefore, 
that “action is needed to eliminate unfair contractual practices between 
business actors all along the food supply chain.”19 
 
Possibilities for Smallholders in Developing Countries, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12326, 12329 
(2012). 
17  A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain in Europe , supra note 2, at 5.  
18 Gaetana Petriccione, I contratti nella riforma della Pac 2014–2020, AGRIREGIONIEUROPA 
(2016), https://agriregionieuropa.univpm.it/it/content/article/31/46/i-contratti-nella-riforma-della-pac-
2014-2020.   
19  A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain in Europe , supra note 2, at 7. The relationship 
between food supply and competition law is very important and should not be overlooked. More on this 
topic by TOMASO FERRANDO & CLAUDIO LOMBARDI, FAIR TRADE ADVOC. OFFICE, EU COMPETITION 
LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN FOOD SYSTEM: ADDRESSING THE BROKEN LINKS (2019). 
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As the ability of different actors to exercise their market power depends 
both on the type of supply chain and the local market conditions, the 
European Commission declares that it will work closely with local 
competition agencies in order to eliminate unfair business practice, increase 
transparency, and design a less fragmented food supply chain.  
IV.  THE ITALIAN LAW ON AGRI-FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 
CONTRACTS  
The call for a fairer agri-food supply chain had a strong answer in Italy. 
Italian legislators adopted a legislation, the so-called “liberalization decree” 
(decreto liberalizzazioni), which legislates on market regulation.20 Among 
many different topics on market regulation, the Act, at Article 62, addresses 
the issue of contracts, bargaining power, and unfair trade practices in the agri-
food supply chain. The aim of the legislature has been to design a fairer 
market characterized by a distributed bargaining power and a ban on several 
practices, defined per se unfair.21  
The article is applicable at every step of the food supply chain, except 
at the final link with the consumer because in Europe, consumer law is part 
of a different body of law.22  
 
20 Decreto Legge n.1/2012 (art. 62) (converted into law by 24 Decreto Legge 24 Marzo 2012, n. 
27) (It.).  
21 D.L. n. 1/2012 (art. 62) (It.). 
The text of the Decree reads as follows: 
Disciplina delle relazioni commerciali in materia di cessione di prodotti agricoli e agroalimentari. 
1. I contratti che hanno ad oggetto la cessione dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari, ad eccezione di 
quelli conclusi con il consumatore finale, sono stipulati obbligatoriamente in forma scritta e indicano a 
pena di nullità la durata, le quantità e le caratteristiche del prodotto venduto, il prezzo, le modalità di 
consegna e di pagamento. I contratti devono essere informati a principi di trasparenza, correttezza, 
proporzionalità e reciproca corrispettività delle prestazioni, con riferimento ai  beni forniti. La nullità del 
contratto puo’ anche essere rilevata d’ufficio dal giudice.  
 2. Nelle relazioni commerciali tra operatori economici, ivi compresi i contratti che hanno ad 
oggetto la cessione dei beni di cui al comma 1, e’ vietato: a) imporre  direttamente o indirettamente 
condizioni di acquisto, di vendita o altre condizioni contrattuali ingiustificatamente gravose, nonché’ 
condizioni extracontrattuali e retroattive; b) applicare condizioni oggettivamente diverse per prestazioni 
equivalenti; c) subordinare la conclusione, l’esecuzione dei contratti e la continuità e regolarità delle 
medesime relazioni commerciali alla esecuzione di prestazioni da parte dei contraenti che, per loro natura 
e secondo gli usi commerciali, non abbiano alcuna connessione con l’oggetto degli uni e delle altre; d) 
conseguire indebite prestazioni unilaterali, non giustificate dalla natura o dal contenuto delle relazioni 
commerciali; e) adottare ogni ulteriore condotta commerciale sleale che risulti tale anche tenendo conto 
del complesso delle relazioni commerciali che caratterizzano le condizioni di approvvigionamento.  
22 Alberto M. Benedetti & Francesca Bartolini, La nuova disciplina dei contratti di cessione dei 
prodotti agricoli e agroalimentari, 3 RIV. DIR. CIV. 641, 647 (2013); Raffaele Tommasini, La nuova 
disciplina dei contratti per i prodotti agricoli e alimentari , 6 RIV. DIR. AL. 1, 10 (2012).  
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Article 62 shall be applied every time that there is a significant 
imbalance of bargaining power between the parties. This pre-requisite is very 
interesting as it is the first time that under Italian law the imbalance is not 
rooted in some objective parameter, such as assets that the debtor can use to 
fulfill his/her obligations. There is no accounting index that may tell us 
objectively when we can affirm imbalance of bargaining power.23 The 
interpreter is therefore obliged to analyze the effective relation that exists 
between the parties, and not just look for formal or economic imbalance.24 
In order to increase transparency in the supply chain, the rule imposes 
that all contracts should be drafted in writing. The written contract should 
indicate for how long the contract will be in force between the parties, quality 
and features of the traded goods, price, delivery options, and terms of 
payment. In this way, all traditional and non-clear contractual arrangements 
will be more accessible. The article imposes, as well, definite payment terms, 
which amount to thirty days for perishable goods and sixty days for 
nonperishable goods. The lack of these elements in the written form will 
make the contract null and void. In any case, in order not to tighten up, all of 
a sudden, the agriculture market, the law specifies that it is deemed to be in 
“written form” all the documents and other communication that are 
exchanged between the parties before the execution of the contract, provided 
that they contain all the elements required by Article 62.  
Article 62 requires that every drafted contract should draw on principles 
of transparency, fairness, and proportionality of the performances. As it has 
been remarked, the law would like to introduce some sort of ethical standards 
within the agri-food supply chain.  
At the same time, in order to reduce imbalance of contractual power, the 
Italian law enumerates a list of practices that all times have to be considered 
unfair. According to Article 62, always considered unfair are contracts 
which:   
a) directly or indirectly impose purchase conditions, sales or 
other contractual terms and conditions unjustifiable and 
extra-contractual and retroactive conditions; b) apply 
objectively different conditions for benefits equivalents; c) 
make the conclusion, performance of the contracts and the 
continuity and regularity of the same commercial relations 
to the performance of services by contractors who, for their 
nature and according to commercial usage, have no 
 
23 Mario Mauro, Contratti della filiera agroalimentare: squilibri ed effettività dei rimedi , 
PERSONA E MERCATO, Sept. 2016, at 17.  
24 E. Rook Basile, La disciplina della cessione dei prodotti agricoli e agroalimentari fra neo-
formalismo contrattuale e abuso del diritto , in II STUDI IN ONORE DI LUIGI COSTATO 361 (2015). 
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connection whatsoever with each other’s objects; d) 
achieving undue unilateral, unjustified benefits the nature or 
content of trade relations; e) adopt any further unfair 
commercial conduct which is such even taking into account 
all the relationships commercial conditions of supply.25 
The Italian law gives the National Competition Authority the duty to 
monitor the implementation of the law. It was clear that private law remedies 
were not called by the weaker party because of fear of retaliation, fear to be 
left out of the market, by the stronger party.26 The “fear factor” clearly 
emerged in a subsequent survey conducted at the European level within the 
Green Paper, which converged in the Communication by the European 
Commission: “the weaker party in a commercial relationship in the food 
supply chain . . . often fears that initiating litigation may lead the stronger 
party to terminate the commercial relationship.”27 This is why it is deemed 
necessary to have public enforcement of this piece of legislation that imposes 
administrative sanctions on those who contravene one of these obligations, 
in addition to criminal sanctions, where the same conduct is also a crime. 
Parties are free to ask for private law remedies, in contract or in tort, if it is 
the case.  
The aim of this legislation is to design an agri-food supply chain where 
many conducts will force actors to change their contracting “bad habits” and 
adopt a new “savoir faire,” inspired by a different logic, one of fairness and 
cooperation. Actually, the main problem of this legislation is that we still do 
not know exactly if it has been implemented in real life, and for sure, we 
know that it has been hardly litigated.  
V.  AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL, AGAIN  
The many issues connected with food production and distribution were 
deemed fundamental at the European level. The European Union, therefore, 
decided not to leave the agri-food supply chain exclusively at Member States’ 
regulations. In the subsequent years, thus, many moves have been made at 
European level. As it has been remarked by some scholars, Europe’s actions 
 
25  D.L. n. 1/2012 (art. 62) (It.) (translation by the author).  
26 Mauro, supra note 23, at 23.  
27 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Business-to-Business Food Supply Chain, at 7, COM (2014) 472 final (July 15, 2014).  
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for the improvement of the chain’s performance have been incremental,28 
ranging from soft law to the recent Directive on unfair trading practices. This 
last part of the article will address specifically those actions that ended in the 
adoption of a directive against unfair trade practices for market sectors larger 
than the agri-food supply chain.  
In this paper, we have already discussed the Commission 
Communication to Parliament in 2009. After those many remarks, it has been 
the turn of the Parliament to intervene in the debate. In 2012, the European 
Parliament, in plenary sitting, acknowledged the dysfunction of the food 
supply chain at every level, with great concerns for farmers and consumers.29 
The Parliament was concerned by the imbalance of power and unfair trade 
practice that affect the agri-food supply chain. In particular, the Parliament 
points at:  
late payments, unilateral contract modifications, unfair 
contract terms, restricted access to the market, lack of 
information on price formation, uneven distribution of profit 
margins throughout the food chain, abuses of market power 
by suppliers or buyers, such as cartels and resale price 
maintenance, and buying alliances.30 
Parliament is concerned, as well, by the conditions of, respectively, 
consumers and farmers. Agricultural producers are threatened by the level of 
concentration of very large retailers as it results in growing imbalances of 
bargaining power, as they “are suffering a progressive loss of bargaining 
power vis-à-vis price levels along the value chain – from primary production, 
through processing to the final consumer.”31 The concern for consumers is 
just a few lines below: “farmers’ income problems are continuing to worsen 
and the prices paid by consumers for products is not reflected in the prices 
paid to farmers for their production,” and “balanced commercial relations 
would not only improve the functioning of the food supply chain, but also 
benefit farmers, through increased competitiveness, and ultimately also 
consumers.”32 In the Joint Motion, the Parliament calls on the Commission 
and Member States to address the problem of unfair distribution of profits 
within the food chain and calls on national and European competition 
 
28 Fabrizio Cafaggi & Paola Iamiceli, Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Retail 
Supply Chain: An Overview on EU Member States’ Legislation and Enforcement Mechanisms, JOINT 
RSCH. CTR., EUR. COMM’N 1 (2018), http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC112654.  
29 Joint Motion for a Resolution, European Parliament Resolution on the Imbalances in the Food 
Supply Chain, EUR. PARL. DOC. RC-B7-0006/2012 (Jan. 18, 2012).  
30 Id. ¶ A. 
31 Id. ¶ B. 
32 Id. ¶¶ C, E.  
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authorities to take action against abusive buyer practices, as well as for a clear 
and objective definition of abusive and unfair practices.33 
The Parliament, therefore, draws a list of practices that raised concerns 
about the correct functioning of the supply chain. The list is rather detailed, 
though non-exhaustive, according to the Parliament Motion, and it is split 
between practices that make it difficult or more burdensome to have access 
to retailers and unfair contractual conditions or unilateral changes to contract 
terms. The Parliament urges the Commission to establish a framework for 
effectively policing these practices.34 
In 2013, the Commission answered the Parliament with a Green Paper 
on Unfair Trading Practices in Food and Non-Food Supply Chain.35 The 
Green Paper does not involve consumers, as it aims at exclusively business-
to-business practices. The consultation received 200 answers from a variety 
of stakeholders’ categories. Both suppliers and buyers were represented.36 
Over the last two decades, the B2B [business-to-business] 
food and non-food supply chain has changed considerably 
for economic, social and demographic reasons. Increased 
concentration and vertical integration across Europe have 
led to structural changes in the B2B food and non-food 
supply chain. Various international retailer buying alliances 
have emerged seeking economies of scale in sourcing 
through greater buying power. The expansion of retailers’ 
own brand has turned some merchants into direct competitor 
of their suppliers. A small number of relatively strong 
players in the supply chain appear to have considerable 
negotiating power.37 
The conclusion is crystal clear: “these factors may . . . lead to unfair 
trading practices (UTP).”  
The definition of Unfair Trade Practices (UTP) in the field of supply 
chains is articulated.   
UTPs are practices that grossly deviate from good 
commercial conduct and are contrary to good faith and fair 
 
33 Id. ¶¶ (H)5, (H)8.  
34 Id. ¶¶ (H)10, (H)11.  
35 Commission Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and 
Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe, COM (2013) 37 final (Jan. 31, 2013).  
36 Consultation on the Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food 
and Supply Chain in Europe, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 31, 2013). 
37 Commission Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and 
Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe, supra note 35, at 1. 
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dealing. UTPs are typically imposed [in a] situation of 
imbalance by a stronger party on a weaker party and can 
exist from any side of the B2B relationship and at any stage 
in the supply chain.38  
The document stresses the importance of freedom of contract as a 
“cornerstone” of any relationship in the market economy, which is 
engendered when there is an imbalance of bargaining power that allows one 
of the parties to impose unilaterally on the weaker counterpart.  
Such situations may arise . . . for agricultural producers, 
which often have a limited choice of business partners for 
the take-up of their production and which, due to the intrinsic 
characteristics of many goods, could be unable to store 
production for a longer period of time in order to obtain 
better buying terms.39  
Among UTP, the Green Paper lists failure to provide sufficient 
information about contract terms, demanding payments for goods or services 
that are of no value to the contractual parties, unilateral or retroactive changes 
of contract terms, as well payments for fictitious services. Unfair trade 
practice may occur at any stage of the formation of the contract, from 
negotiations to the performance of the contract. They can consist as well in 
retroactive contractual changes. Moreover, the inability to switch to another 
business partner and to terminate the existing relationship is a key factor in 
the development of unfair trade practice along the supply chain.  
The outcome of the Green Paper consultation has been to provide a 
taxonomy of the UTPs, accepted and confirmed by stockholders. There are 
four main categories: “a trading partner’s retroactive misuse of unspecified, 
ambiguous or incomplete contract terms; a trading partner’s excessive and 
unpredictable transfer of costs or risks to its counterparty; a trading partner’s 
use of confidential information; the unfair termination or disruption of a 
commercial relationship.”40 The effects of UTPs in the food supply chain are 
varied, including undue costs, lower than expected revenues, ability or 
willingness to fund investments, negative effects to access new markets on 
the side of the weaker party.  
The consultation paper was fruitful: it was almost immediately 
translated in a Communication from the Commission to the Parliament, the 
 
38 Id. at 3.  
39 Id. 
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling Unfair Trading Practices 
in the Business-to-Business Food Supply Chain, supra note 27, at 5. 
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Council, and other European bodies. The document stresses the necessity to 
tackle unfair trading practices,41 a problem well acknowledged by all 
stakeholders in the food supply chain.42  
The Communication by the Commission acknowledges the overall 
fairness and sustainability in the supply chain, but, nevertheless, 
acknowledges that the presence in the food supply chain by the stakeholders 
is lamented.  
At the European level, however, the possibility of having a regulatory 
action or prescribing a single solution to address the issue of UTPs was 
discarded. Member States, therefore, have been invited to take any legislative 
or administrative step that can be of contrast to UTPs. The choice of leaving 
Member States free to choose their own means to fight UTPs is mainly due 
to the fact that the food supply chain is still very local and not integrated at 
the European level, and the legislation of every single Member State is still 
very much diverse on the side of B2B relationships. Every Member State 
answered the call, each one in its own way.43 According to a detailed 
comparative study, “the legal landscape is rather diverse across the EU.”44 
The big majority of the Member States (twenty out of twenty-eight at the 
time) enacted some kinds of norms that address unfair trade practices in B2B 
relations. Among those that have introduced new rules, some have opted for 
legislation, some have opted for a pure self-regulatory option, and many have 
chosen a hybrid approach that combines legislation with self-regulation.45 
The final step has been the adoption at the European level of Directive 
2019/633 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in 
the agricultural and food supply chain.46 In order to have a better agricultural 
market and to combat imbalances in bargaining power in the agri-food supply 
chain, the Directive lists a number of practices that are considered per se 
unfair, mainly practices related to late payments and cancellation of orders, 
when imposed unilaterally by one contractual party to the other.  
The Directive should be adopted by every Member State no later than 
May 2021 and then applied by November 2021. “As a majority of Member 
States already have national rules on unfair trading practices, albeit diverging 
rules,” the Directive states that  
 
41 Id. at 2.  
42 Id. at 3. 
43 Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 28, at 7. 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 Council Directive 2019/633, 2019 O.J. (L 111) 59 (EU).  
1 - GARDELLA TEDESCHI (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2021  3:29 PM 
2021] Contract Law in the Agri-Food Supply Chain 441 
 
Member States should not be precluded from maintaining or 
introducing in their territory stricter national rules that 
provide for a higher level of protection against unfair trading 
practices in business-to-business relationships in the 
agricultural and food supply chain, subject to the limits of 
Union law applicable to the functioning of the internal 
market, provided that such rules are proportionate.47 
One example of a stricter rule than the Directive would be the 
requirement of the written form in contracts along the supply chain.48 As we 
saw, the Italian Article 62 deems null and void the contract if it is not written. 
The Directive on UTP does not require any particular form for the validity of 
the contract, even though at Whereas 23,49 the Directive considers that “the 
use of written contracts in the agricultural and food supply chain may help to 
avoid certain unfair trading practices.” We still don’t know how Italy will 
adopt the Directive, but we may think that the requirement of the written 
contract may remain in Italian legislation. For the moment, this chapter of the 
saga still has to be written.  
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  
The concerns about contract law in the agri-food supply chain are part 
of a wider picture in contract theory. From a theoretical point of view, indeed, 
the contractual “habits” along the agri-food supply chain can easily fit in 
Macaulay’s paradigm of “non-contractual relations in business,” where the 
quality of the relationship and the social sanctions are deemed more 
important than the remedies provided by the law.50 But in this case, the “non-
contractual relation” is an abusive one, as parties fear more the social 
sanctions of being thrown out of the market more than the exploitation from 
stronger parties. The studies from European bodies highlight this concern. 
The Italian experience can teach us more than we might think: the litigation 
on Article 62 has been totally irrelevant. We still do not know if it is because 
 
47 Id., at 64 (39).  
48 BERT KEIRSBILCK & EVELYNE TERRYN, UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES IN THE FOOD SUPPLY 
CHAIN: IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECTIVE (EU) 2019/633 (2020).  
49 Council Directive 2019/633, 2019 O.J. (L 111) 59 (EU).  
50 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. 
REV. 55, 63 (1963). His theories about relational contracts are a major staple in contract law not only in  
the States. Cf. MARC AMSTUTZ & GUNTHER TEUBNER, NETWORKS: LEGAL ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL 
CO-OPERATION (2009); JEAN BRAUCHER, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM C. WHITFORD, REVISITING THE 
CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL (2013); 
DAVID CAMPBELL, HUGH COLLINS & JOHN WIGHTMAN, IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, 
RELATIONAL, AND NETWORK CONTRACTS (2003).  
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the law has been very well implemented or because the parties’ fear of 
reporting unfair practices is stronger.  
If we really want to assure a fairer life for every party in the supply 
chain, it is paramount that, besides implementing laws and directives, the 
authorities must exercise their power of inspection that is given to them, or 
weak parties will never be able to make themselves heard.  
 
